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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JAMES HARLESTON LINDEN,

:

Petitioner and
Appellant,

:

vs.

:

THE STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, and THE STATE OF
:
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND
PAROLE,
:
:
Respondent and
Appellee,

Appellate Court No.
20020912-CA

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellee's Brief is littered with numerous asides that attempt
to obfuscate the central issues on appeal.

This Court should not

be sidetracked by any of Appellee's superfluous arguments.
merits

of

this

case

cry

out

to

be

heard,

and

this

The
Court

should properly focus its attention upon them.
One aside mentioned first in Appellee's Brief (at 3) rather
than at the lower court and thus is not part of any record, is
"...after scientific advances in DNA technology permitted...". This
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is nowhere in any record, and was never even discussed or argued
at any stage of any proceeding.

The implication is that DNA

technology was somehow involved in Mr. Linden's charge.

It was

not, and its incorporation within the Statement of Facts by
Appellee is exactly the type of superfluity that could have a
negative impact but is totally without substance.

This statement

needs to be excised from consideration. The summary of the balance
of Appellant's arguments in this reply brief are as follows.
The Appellee's urging to find Utah Administrative Code Rule
671-518-1 as mandatory is not in conformity with statute, other
administrative rules, nor cas€> law.
understood

The word "may" should be

in its common usage, and cannot be

"mandatory" .

construed

as

This is further contrasted by the use of the word

"shall" in subsequent administrative rules, which relate to the
same general issues of parole revocation.
In the final analysis, the option of R671-518-1 was never
reached by the Parole Board.

Instead, they elected to hold a

parole board hearing and subjected themselves to the fairness
requirements of due process.

R671-518-1 is a non-issue.

Another argument raised by Appellee, with equally less than
candescent illumination, is that Mr. Linden was somehow tasked with
the responsibility of revealing to the Board at the hearing, all of
his past ignominies and misdeeds.

In other words, that he was

required, at the hearing, to inform the Board of his involvement in
a crime that occurred, at that time, 13 years previously. This was
2

to be offered by the inmate irrespective even though it wasn't in
the parole agreement. Since it was not in the parole agreement as
a requirement (and until there is an amendment taking the Fifth
Amendment out of the U.S. Constitution), Mr. Linden should not be
held to a requirement of which he had no knowledge.
This issue, again, is a non-issue as this is NOT the reason
Mr. Linden's parole was violated.

He was violated for violating

Condition Three of his parole agreement.
The last issue raised by Appellee is that Utah should
recognize and adopt the holding in the Patuxent case cited by both
the Appellee and Appellant.

The Appellee argues that this case

allows parole to be revoked for violation of a condition of parole
during the term of parole; for commission of a crime, whether or
not the parole term has started; or for misconduct occurring either
before, or after, the grant of parole. Patuxent Institution Board
of Review v. Clarence J. Hancock, 620 A.2d 917, 930 (Maryland App.
1993) .
This would mean that since Mr. Linden had committed a crime
predating the granting of parole (in this case 1986), that under
the

law

of

this

case

he

could

have

his

parole

violated.

Unfortunately, this is actually the "smoking gun" case that favors
the Appellant.

The Appellee neglected to include the very next

sentence, which states "When violation of a condition of parole is
alleged, the parolee must be aware that the conduct constituting
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the violation is prohibited by a condition of parole". There is no
condition of parole that states that parole can be violated for a
crime that predates the parole. It would have been a simple matter
to include that as a special condition. It certainly is not listed
in Condition Three of Mr. Linden's parole agreement. Under the law
in this case, Mr. Linden should not have had his parole revoked.
Consequently, this Court should reverse the decision of the
trial court and Mr. Linden should be immediately released.
ARGUMENT
The argument raised by Appellee regarding the application of
Qt. Admin. Code R671-518-1 was addressed in Appellant's Brief and
will not be further examined in this Reply Brief except in a
limited fashion.

Appellee argues throughout his brief that,

although the Board of Pardons "was not required to do so" by virtue
of this rule, they held a parole revocation hearing nevertheless.
The implication is that R671-518-1 mandates a virtually automatic
parole revocation.

This is not the case.

R671-518-1 provides

If a parolee has been charged with a new criminal
offense, which is also the basis for revocation, and the parolee is
convicted of a criminal charge, the Board may revoke parole upon
receipt of verification of conviction. The Board need not hold a
parole revocation or evidentiary hearing even if the parolee
continues to deny guilt. It is sufficient that a trial court has
adjudicated guilt.
However, the Board may schedule a special
appearance hearing or parole rehearing if it wishes to ask
questions of the parolee or a victim asks to give testimony. The
Board may revoke parole and reincarcerate even if the criminal
trial court or appellate court has granted a Certificate of
Probably Cause in the criminal matter. After a conviction of guilt
and revocation of parole, the Board may then place the parolee on
a hearing calendar. (Addendum 5, Brief of Appellee).
4

This rule allows

for a revocation of parole upon the

requirements set forth above.

However, the critical element here

is that this was not the election of the Board.

Under rules of

statutory construction, the use of the word "may" allows a choice.
(Cite).

The use of "may" is replete within R671-518-1.

it begins

in

the

first

sentence

In fact,

("...the Board may

revoke

parole. . .") and continues "... the Board may schedule a...", "... the
Board may revoke parole and reincarcerate...", and "...the Board
may then...". May allows may not. The Board of Pardons evidently
made

their election

to allow Mr. Linden the opportunity of

presenting a defense to their allegation that he violated Parole
Agreement Condition Number Three (Brief of Appellant, pgs. 5-9, 1221) .
Although R671-518-1 provides the "may" option, Utah Code Ann
f 77-27-11 (cited by Appellant at 3 and 12 of Appellant's Brief and
its Addendum A, and Appellee's Brief at 2,5 and 9 and its Addendum
2) it is clear that its requirements are not optional.

Although

paragraph 1 of this section utilizes "may" in that the board "may"
revoke the parole of any person found to have violated a condition
of parole, 1, paragraph (5)(a) does not. It states, "The board or

1

Utah Code Ann. Section 77-25-11 states:

77-27-11. Revocation of Parole.
(1) The board may revoke the parole of any person who
is found to have violated any condition of his parole.
5

its appointed examiner shall conduct a hearing on the alleged
violation, and the parolee shall have written notice of the time
and place of the hearing, the alleged violation of parole, and a
statement of the evidence against him". "Shall" is not "may", and
in accordance universally accepted rules of statutory construction
"shall" means there is not an election, but is a predicate to the
command "it will occur".

It would appear then that the board may

indeed violate an inmate's parole, but if it intends to, then it
must follow certain requirements, among which are written notice of
the hearing, the alleged violation, and so forth.
Even if the Court did not conclude that the statutory language
in U.C.A. I 77-27-11 of "shall" didn't trump "may", it should
nevertheless

reach the "non-mandatory" conclusion

(i.e., that

R671-518-1 is not mandatory) by referencing Utah Administrative
Code Rule 671-521. Rule 671-521-1 allows alternatives other than
further imprisonment for parole violators.

It also incorporates

the word "may" and is as follows:
R671-521-1.

Alternatives to Re-Incarceration of

Parolees.
The Board may pursue alternatives other than further
imprisonment for parole violators. A parole violation shall not
preclude an offender from being considered for continuance on
parole or re-parole. 2 (Addendum 1).

2

Craig Bennett, Linden's parole agent, stated in the
Warrant Request & Parole Violation Report, "It is the
recommendation of Region III staff that Linden be given credit
for his time served in Idaho and granted a Utah parole date as
early as feasible." (Brief of Appellant, Addendum D, page 3).
6

The administrative rules themselves, upon which Petitioner has
hung his figurative hat, when examined en toto, also do not lend
support to Petitioner's position.
The statute and administrative rules do not stand alone. The
parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he
can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did, that
circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not
warrant revocation.

Morrissev v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972),

1972.SCT.42540<http://www.versuslaw.com>,
Moreover,

the

propriety

of

extending

at
due

9,

para.

process

to

44.
Board

proceedings has been established by the Utah Supreme Court which
declared: "Due process pursuant to article 1, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution, requires that the inmate know what information the
Board will be considering at the hearing and that the inmate know
soon enough in advance to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare
responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies". Peterson v. Utah Board of
Pardons,

931

P.2d

147

(Ut.

Court

of

Appeal,

1997),

1997.UT.15942<http://www.versuslaw.com> at 14, para. 71 (citing
Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909).
Lastly, R671-518-1 is a non-issue if only because there is not
evidence before

this Court that the Parole Board considered

applying R671-518-1.

It wasn't applied; instead, there was a

parole board hearing. Because there was a parole board hearing,
Utah Code Ann. f 77-27-11 applies.
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In conclusion, raising the spectre of R671-518-1 and its
alleged omnipotence is, as has been illustrated, at best a strawman
argument easily dismantled by the scarecrows of logic. It attempts
to obscure through misdirection the real issue, to wit: is it
violative of fundamental due process for the parole board to set
conditions of parole, to which the inmate agrees, and then apply
the conditions retroactively?

That this issue is not addressed

speaks volumes.
The next argument by Appellee relates to the issue that
Appellant's withholding or concealing of his knowledge about the
Idaho murder

also

constituted

conditions of his Utah parole.

a violation

of the terms and

(Brief of Appellee at 11)•

The most serious problem with that argument is that this is
not why Mr. Linden's parole was violated.

There is simply no

evidence in the documents before this Court that his withholding or
concealing of his knowledge about the Idaho murder constituted a
violation of the conditions of his parole agreement.

If so, which

one? Addendum B of the Brief of Appellant is a copy of the parole
agreement.

There is nothing within the four corners of that

agreement, signed and agreed to by both Mr. Linden and authorized
by the Board of Pardons by their representative's signature, that
requires Mr. Linden to tell the parole board about any prior
misdeeds.
Applying the logic of Appellee's argument to the case at bar,
Mr. Linden would be required, then, as mentioned in Appellant's
8

Brief at 19, to bare his breast and confess to every crime he had
ever committed, just to be on the safe side.

All misdemeanors,

felonies, infractions, including speeding, jay walking, income tax
fudging, etc. must be disgorged, covering the lifetime of the
parolee.

This not only is not practical, it was not required by

the Parole Board by the Parole Agreement.

It is not even required

in the Special Conditions, which are the non-stock requirements.
An inmate should not have to contend with a legal game of hide
the banana. If Mr. Linden was required to tell the parole board of
any other crimes with which he had some involvement as a condition
of parole (and aren't there serious Fifth Amendment issues?), then
the Parole Board had a duty to spell it out in the Parole
Agreement.

It was not.

This argument is specious and non-

meritorious.
Finally, as to this issue, Appellee cites State v. Barnes, 826
P.2d 1346 (Idaho App. 1992) in support of the notion Mr. Linden was
required to tell the parole board about his 1986 Idaho crime, and
therefore his failure to so do constituted a violation of his Utah
parole. This case is inapposite. Although the facts are somewhat
similar to Lindens, the similarity is superficial.

This case has

absolutely nothing to do with parole revocation.

There was no

finding that the party charged violated his parole by withholding
information of a prior offense. Eugene (therein probably lies the
reason for his lifelong criminal behavior) Barnes pled guilty to
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being an accessory to a murder and was sentenced to two years. He
appealed this sentence because he felt the sentence was excessive.
He was not on parole and there were no revocation of parole issues.
Barnes simply does not apply.
The final issue raised in appellee's brief faults appellant
for failing to acknowledge a particular holding in the Patuxent
case cited by both appellant and appellee. Brief of appellee at 13.
Appellee states, "the Maryland Court of Appeals held that parole
may be revoked for violation of a condition of parole during the
term of parole; for commission of a crime, whether or not the
parole term has started; or for misconduct occurring either before,
or after, the grant of parole". Ibid. This statement is taken out
of context and its meaning is thus altered. The next sentence was
not included, and continues "When violation of a condition of
parole is alleged, the parolee must be aware that the conduct
constituting

the violation

parole".(Emphasis mine).

is prohibited

by

a

condition

of

Patuxent Institution Board of Review v.

Clarence J. Hancock. 620 A.2d 917, 930

(Maryland App. 1993),

1993.MD.40309,<http://www.versuslaw.com>,at 14, para. 80.

Since

virtually the entire case is a treatise on the issue on the
prospective application of a condition of parole and appropriate
notice to the parolee of the condition, a meaning not intended by
the holding of the case is particularly obvious.

As in the

Maryland case, Utah must insure that the parolee is aware that the
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conduct constituting a violation of parole is prohibited by a
condition of parole.

In other words, the parolee, to have his

parole violated, must violate a condition of parole.

It must not

be a superfluity, or an ambiguity, or an amorphous prior conduct.
It must

be

straightforward

and

spelled

out

in the parole

agreement.
Patuxent is the appellant's smoking gun. It should be adopted
in Utah.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, appellant asks this Court to reverse
the decision of the District Court granting a dismissal of the
Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus. James Harleston Linden should
be given his immediate release.
DATED this 11th day of July, 2003.
Respectfully submitted,

MORRISON & MORRISON, LLC

Grant W. P. Morrison
Attorney for Petitioner/
Appellant
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Patrick B. Nolan, Esq.
Annina M. Mitchell, Esq.
Assistant Attorney's General
160 East 300 South, 5th and 6th Floors
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
on the 11th day of July, 2003.
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being considered for continuance on parole or re-parole.
R671-521-2. Considerations.
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